A simple but powerful theoretical model for watermarking and attacks is presented. The attack consists of Wiener estimation of the watermark, followed by weighted feedback of the estimate to reduce the detector's correlation value. The Wiener attack is provably optimal, and it leads to the notion of energy-efficient watermarking, the generation of watermarks that resist Wiener estimation. It also leads to a meaningful way to measure watermark robustness. Designing watermarks to resist the attack produces a power-spectrum condition (PSC): the watermark's power spectrum should be a scaled version of the original document's. Experiments with signal models demonstrate the importance of the PSC and show that watermarks that fail to meet the PSC may be vulnerable to attack. These analytic predictions are confirmed with experiments on natural images. The paper provides a theoretical basis for the popular heuristic argument that a watermark should be embedded in the "perceptually significant frequency components" of the original document and discourages the use of watermarks whose power spectra are not closely matched to the original document's power spectrum.
INTRODUCTION
Digital watermarking is the secure, robust transmission of information by embedding it into a digital document for subsequent retrieval [l, 2, 31 . Example applications for this relatively young field include copyright protection and broadcast monitoring. Often, a watermark should be imperceptible: the watermarked and original documents should be perceptually indistinguishable. An attack is any processing of a watermarked document that may impair the watermark [4, 51. A watermark should also usually be robust, meaning that it cannot be impaired or removed without also making the attacked document useless. Most watermarking methods employ some form of spread-spectrum communications [6] , whose properties may enable it to meet these requirements.
Currently, it is difficult to analyze robustness because it is difficult to model the vast set of possible attacks. Consequently, it is not clear how to design a watermark to enhance its robustness. Some researchers (e.g., [I, 21) have heuristically argued that an image watermark should be embedded in the "perceptually significant spectral components" to make it less perceptible and/or more resistant to attacks. However, others have proposed placing the watermark in the middle or high frequencies to make it easier to separate from the original image [7, 81 or making it white, as in conventional spread spectrum.
This paper elaborates on a simple theoretical watermarking and attack model from [9] . Analysis leads to a meaningful way to evaluate robustness. It is shown that watermarks that resist the attack should satisfy a powerspectrum condition. Finally, experiments with theoretical signal models and natural images verify and reinforce the importance of this condition.
WATERMARK MODELS
We now present a model that covers many proposed watermarking methods. We denote an M-dimensional (M- Then the watermarked document is
(1) 
Wiener Attack Model
To model the attack, we assume that the attacker uses the the Wiener attack; it is a generalization of an attack model presented in [9] . A block diagram appears in Fig. 1. 
Analysis
By independence, the Wiener filter has transfer function Letting E denote the MSE of the Wiener estimate, it is readily shown [lo] that Since both the cross-correlation and distortion can now be parameterized by y, we have written them as u $ , ( y ) and Dg,(y), respectively. From (ll), the cross-correlation decreases linearly with y. For the distortion, (12) indicates that Dg,(y) decreases proportional to y2 as y goes from 0 to 1; then it increases with y2 as y increases further.
Optimality and Special Cases
The Wiener attack is optimal in the following sense: Among all linear, shift-invariant (LSI) processing and will therefore increase the distortion of the attacked document.
Two special cases for the Wiener attack follow. First, when y = 1, we have a removal attack, which removes as much watermark energy as possible and minimizes Dg,.
However, it does not always reduce aiw significantly. This form of the Wiener attack originally appeared in [9] . Second, suppose the attacker sets y = yo = u:/u:.
From (ll), this choice of y makes ugw = 0, so that reliable detection becomes impossible. We call this attack an anticorrelation attack. It is similar to an attack proposed by Langelaar et al.
[ll], who used nonlinear filtering to estimate part of a white-noise watermark and amplified the estimate to drive the cross-correlation to zero. However, our Wiener attack model is simpler to analyze because it is linear, and it allows us to consider watermarks with nonwhite power spectra. In addition, we now have a well-defined criterion for evaluating robustness. Among watermarks with different power spectra, the watermark that produces the largest value of Dg, for a given value of aiw is most robust. An attacker must incur the most distortion when attacking this watermark. Conversely, for a given value of Dex, the watermark with the greatest value of aiw is most robust. 
AND A ROBUSTNESS C R I T E R I O N

R E S I S T I N G THE WIENER A T T A C K : THE P O W E R -S P E C T R U M C O N D I T I O N
C o n s e q u e n c e s of the PSC
We call (14) the power-spectrum condition (PSC) and say that a watermark satisfying (14) is PSC-compliant. I t states that, in order to be energy-efficient, the watermark should look like the original, in terms of power spectra.
The most important result is that a PSC-compliant watermark is most robust among all independent watermarks: Corollary 1 A PSC-compliant watermark is most robust among independent watermarks because it yields the largest value of Dg, for the same cross-correlation U:,.
Proof: Combining (11) and (12) gives which is maximized when U: is minimized. Since a PSCcompliant watermark maximizes E , (10) shows that it also By definition, PSC-compliant watermarks are energyefficient independent watermarks, and EPSC / U : = (YPSC.
Although they cannot achieve Epsc/aL = 1, imperceptibility implies that U: >> a:, so that apse M 1. For WDR 5 -25 dB, 0.9968 < apse < 1. Hence, PSCcompliant watermarks can hardly be estimated by a Wiener filter.
Also, the Wiener filter transfer function (4) becomes minimizes U;.
m From (9), U: = U $ / (U: + U ; ) = (1 -crpsc)u$. Then (11) and (12) become
and
Eqs. (18) and (19) show that the behavior does not depend on the dimensionality M . The removal attack (y = 1) is ineffective because (18) and (19) reduce to a&,(l) = Dpx(l) = ( Y P S C U~ M a;. Neither the cross-correlation nor the distortion are significantly affected by this attack. For the anticorrelation attack, using YO,PSC = 1/ (1 -a p s c ) makes O&,,(YO,PSC) = 0, but Dg,(yO,psc) = U:. That is, the attacked document has quality DNRo, = 0 dB, which renders it useless.
E X P E R I M E N T A L R E S U L T S
Having conducted mathematical analysis, we now present some experimental results for both ideal signal models and natural images. As signal models, we use 1-D pth-order autoregressive (AR(p)) models [lo] The lowpass watermarks are clearly more robust than the others. It is not possible to drive U& towards zero without also incurring a large drop in DNRg,. The lowpass I1 watermark is "close" to being PSC-compliant, and it performs nearly as well as the lowpass I (PSC-compliant) watermark.
It is clear that a PSC-compliant watermark is superior. For any usw, DNRg, is lowest for a PSC-compliant watermark. Hence, the attacker must distort the attacked document most when attacking a document with a PSC- 
Natural Image Results
The next set of experimental results are for the 256 x 256 grayscale Cameraman image and are indicative of experiments with other images. Various watermarks were generated in accord with the 2-D separable AR models. PSCcompliant watermarks were generated via the periodogram of the original image (see [9] ). Each watermark was embedded with a WDR of -30 dB, corresponding to a peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) of 42.24 dB. Detection was performed with the aid of the original image. Fig. 3 shows the predicted performance of the different watermarks. Again, the PSC-compliant watermark performs the best. Fig. 4 shows the results of the removal and anticorrelation attacks on different watermarked images. Example images for the highpass watermark are not shown since it was effectively attacked, as predicted in Fig. 3 . The removal attack is fairly effective against the bandpass watermark, less so against the white watermark, and completely ineffective against the lowpass I and PSC-compliant watermarks.
The anticorrelation attack is effective against both the bandpass and white watermarks. Although the attacked, white-watermarked image suffers a quality loss of 7.5 dB, the attacked image is still usable (the PSNR is 34.78 dB). The attack severely distorts the lowpass I-watermarked image, making it unusable. Finally, the attack completely destroys the PSC-compliant-watermarked image. In fact, the attacked image is equal to the mean of the original image. These conclusions agree with the heuristic argument that a watermark should be embedded in the spectrally significant components (e.g., [l, 21) . We have taken the intuitive argument, given it a strong theoretical foundation, and stated it in a precise and convenient form: the power-spectrum condition. Simply put, the watermark should look like the original. The model is very general and can be applied to many types of data (audio, image, video, etc.). PSC-compliant watermarks are energy-efficient, and they are the most robust independent watermarks in the sense described in this paper. Conversely, watermarks that do not satisfy the PSC may be vulnerable to the Wiener attack, particularly its anticorrelation form.
